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ABSTRACT
BAKER, RACHEL Time to cry over spilled milk: An investigation into China’s food
safety system. Asian Studies Department, March 2012.
Advisor: Mark Dallas
China is plagued with food safety scandals ranging from contamination of dairy,
to exploding watermelons in the countryside. This thesis explores the four main reasons
that China has many food safety regulatory issues: the wide dispersion of farms in China,
the fragmentation of the food safety regulatory system, weakness of local
implementation, and the poor structure of commerce. Using the case studies of the dairy
and pork industries this thesis examines these four proposed flaws and proposed solutions
for improving food safety in China. Governmental flaws and mistakes are mostly
responsible for these problems, but the current structure of government is too
bureaucratic and corrupt to properly handle the problem. Therefore, improvement of food
safety relies on private enterprises.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2008, a bizarre illness was spreading across China; infants across the country
were found to have kidney stones. Parents and doctors alike were baffled at what could
be causing these kidney stones, which led to life-threatening illnesses in 300,000
individuals, mostly children, and the deaths of at least 6 infants.1 The cause of these
health issues was discovered to be melamine, a nitrogen-rich chemical usually used for
the manufacture of fertilizers, plastics, laminates, paints and adhesives. Toxic when
consumed by humans, melamine can cause renal failure and dysfunction, a fact that was
known years before this scandal.2 In 2008 it was discovered that workers at Sanlu, one of
the leading dairy companies in China, were adding melamine to milk in order to make it
appear to have a higher protein content, rendering it more marketable and of higher
monetary value. Melamine usage was highly concentrated in the production of baby
formula. The apparently nutrient rich infant formula would seem to be highly beneficial
to the health of babies and motivate parents to buy it, but the addition of melamine was
potentially lethal.
News about Sanlu’s melamine-tainted baby formula first reached the media in late
August (although Sanlu officials had known about the contamination for many months)
and it quickly spread through national and international media. Ironically, Sanlu was
officially recognized only 8 months earlier for its quality and standards, including for its
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Xiu Changbai. (2010). Melamine in milk products in China: Examining the factors that
led to the deliberate use of the contaminant. Food Policy, 35(5), 464.
2
Pei Xiaofeng et al. (2011). The China melamine milk scandal and its implications for
food safety regulation. Food Policy, 36(3), 415.
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infant formula.3 The company was required to recall all of its dairy products and was
forced into bankruptcy because of the revenue loss caused by this recall. In Chinese
courts, two people were sentenced to death for adding melamine to the milk and then
selling it to the manufacturers. Many of the company’s leaders were fined and
imprisoned; the company’s general manager and chairwoman was sentenced to four life
terms in prison. 4 Adding to the atmosphere of fear throughout China was the discovery
of melamine in almost all dairy products throughout the country. There was a worldwide
recall of all Chinese products that contained dairy, even candies. Blame for these
incidents was found everywhere and new legislation was drawn up to help improve food
safety regulations. Nevertheless, despite the severe punishments and new legislation in
the three years since this scandal, food safety violations have become commonplace in
China’s media and melamine has not disappeared from the dairy industry. Exploding
watermelons, fake tofu preserved with formaldehyde, and clenbuterol-fed pigs dominate
the daily headlines, and reports of melamine-tainted milk continue; it is as if nothing has
changed.
The Chinese people were baffled by these events; how could their government
have allowed this to happen? Exacerbating matters was the fact that this was not the first
incident in the dairy industry. In 2003 it was discovered that many companies in the dairy
industry were producing substandard or fake milk powder. This led to the deaths of 12
babies and severe cases of malnutrition in hundreds of babies, but there were no changes
in government regulation. In response some people have turned to creating co-ops and
3
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growing their own food, but many do not have that opportunity and are forced to continue
to buy food of mysterious provenance. Trust of the dairy industry in China has not yet
returned and today many middle and upper class parents of young children only buy
imported baby formula or buy it in travels to Korea, Japan or Hong Kong;5 even post
offices in Chinatowns in the United States are stocked with infant formula to send back to
relatives in China. Western restaurant chains, such as KFC, that were thought to be safe,
now have records of high contamination and some government ministries grow their own
food for their employees. The Chinese people no longer know who to trust.
Additionally, the rise in food safety concerns occurred concurrently with the
widespread change in food consumption patterns in China and an equally drastic change
in food production. In the past 30 years, food consumption patterns have changed from
eight parts grain, one part meat-poultry-fish, and one part vegetables-fruit to four parts
grain, three parts meat-poultry-fish, and three parts vegetables-fruit. 6 Consumption of
grain, which once was the only staple of the Chinese diet, is now declining and a rising
proportion of grains is going towards animal feed rather than human consumption.
Similar to other developing countries with rising incomes, there is no longer a clear
divide between a staple food, in this case rice, and luxury foods such as meat.
Changing consumption patterns have caused equally drastic changes in
production patterns and alterations in production. Brand new industries, such as beef,
have quickly entered the market on a massive scale and are now booming. Meat
production, for example, rose from 11.1 million tons in 1978 to 74.43 million tons in
5

K.B. Richburg. (2011, August 11). China seeks to address food-safety crisis. The
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2005.7 Much of this growth was supported by the government as it encouraged farmers to
diversify and break away from only farming grain or pork.8 This growth has also been
driven by the changing appetites and incomes of the Chinese people. As the middle class
in China has grown, demand for “richer” foods has grown, and meat and dairy have
become common items in the Chinese diet. Therefore more meat and dairy are being
produced in order to meet the demands of consumption.
Because of the rising consumption of food and changes in production of food over
the past twenty years, China has had to adjust from being a country concerned about food
security, having enough food, to being a country that is more concerned with food safety,
the quality of the food. Due to the high profile of food safety scandals since 2008, food
safety has become an extremely important issue for the current Chinese government.
During celebrations for the 90th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party this July, a
high level report was issued urging the government to make food safety a national
security issue. Food safety is considered to be at the heart of social stability, which
President Hu Jintao continuously stresses as one of China’s more important issues. 9
Recently a campaign has begun to teach the Chinese people more about the importance of
food safety, to care about food safety, and alert farmers to potentially hazardous farming
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Peter Li. (2009). Exponential Growth, Animal Welfare, Environmental and Food Safety
Impact: The Case of China’s Livestock Production. Journal of Agricultural and
Environmental Ethics, 22, 221.
8
Although most farms were concentrated in grain production 30 years ago, since it was
the main staple of the Chinese diet, pork production was also extremely common. Pork
has always been the most consumed meat in China. Pork is included here because of the
commonplace consumption of pork, even 30 years ago. The government encouraged the
production of other meats, because of pork’s existing popularity.
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(2011, July 9). Getting to grips with food safety. South China Post. Retrieved from
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practices.10 The government is even offering rewards to informants who provide
information about tainted food and protection from the companies they are reporting.11
This is part of a year long effort that aims to improve food safety in China through
education and raising awareness about food safety.
These efforts are largely ad hoc, impractical and cannot offer a long-term
solution to the problem at large. Growing your own food is only sustainable for a small
portion of the population as is buying only imported infant formula. China’s income is
growing, but a large portion of the population is still extremely poor and therefore will
not be able to purchase foods from trustworthy brands or feed their babies imported
formula. Education about food safety on the other hand is important, but the consumer
does not have much power, even when educated, to control food safety. Another solution
offered by the Chinese government, has been harsher punishment for offenders as a way
to deter farmers, middlemen and business-owners from producing unsafe food, but this is
not a solution, only a demonstration of the government’s lack of power.12 Two people
were put to death and one person was sentenced to life in prison after the melamine-milk
scandal with Sanlu and food safety issues remain; harsher punishments in this case seem
to be ineffective. Additionally the only way the people learn of food safety issues is
through the media, which in some cases has been responsible for escalating the scandals
and has led to results when the government has not. Therefore, these solutions are only
10
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viable in the short-term; the long-term solutions and the problem of regulating food
safety remains.

MAJOR PROBLEMS AFFECTING FOOD SAFETY
Scholars and government officials blame these food safety issues on four main
factors: the wide dispersion of farms in China, the poor structure of commerce, the
fragmentation of the food safety regulatory system and weakness of local
implementation. First, some scholars have pointed to the structure and wide dispersion of
farms in China. Agriculture in China is based on the small family farm with the vast
majority of Chinese farms having less than 10 workers. Small scale farming in China has
dated as far back as the 1600s. More recently, the household responsibility system
reinforces this small-scale structure by dividing land usage equally among residents of a
town or village. Since land is scarce and is being divided between many people, the farms
run by each family unit are very small, usually just more than one acre.13 Officials and
some Chinese economists argue that the small farms hinder regulatory measures, because
the sheer number and wide dispersion of small farms is hard to physically regulate. There
is not enough manpower to monitor so many farms. Since the contamination of many
foods, including milk in 2008, happened before it reached the processing plant, it further
supports the idea that the large dispersion of farms is too great for effective regulation.14
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Philip Huang. (2011). China’s new-age farms and their vertical integration:
Agribusiness or Co-ops? Modern China, 37(2), 111.
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Yu Xiaodong. (2001, June 1). Farmers, corporations, and the government: Who’s to
Blame? News China, 15.
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They argue for horizontal integration, large-scale industrial farms based on the model of
the American agribusiness system.15
A second problem that scholars say is to blame for the food safety scandals
throughout China is the poor structure of commerce. The structure of commerce in China
is highly unorganized; therefore scholars argue that the process from production to
consumption should be streamlined in order to ensure regulation and safety.16 Sanlu was
once the largest producer of dairy in all of China, but almost all of the milk came from
small farmers and was not supplied by Sanlu itself.17 The commercial structure linking
farm to store includes many middlemen, creating many places for error. For the
production of dairy for example, the farmers take their cows from the farms to the local
milk collecting stations where the cows are milked. From there the milk is sent by a
middleman to a processing and manufacturing plant where the raw milk is processed and
changed into many different forms of dairy. From the manufacturing plant it goes to the
wholesalers, to the retails, and finally to the consumers.18 During the melamine scandal,
melamine was added at the stage after the milk stations by the middlemen. There were no
checks before the milk from the middlemen went into processing, leaving room for many
flaws. By contrast scandals in the pork industry occur mostly on the farm. When the pork
reaches the processing plant, the only quality control at the plant checks the protein
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content of the meat.19 There are few checks for additives or hazardous chemicals when
the pork arrives at the processing plant, therefore many problems can go unnoticed. The
commercial process from farm to consumer has too many steps, so there are also many
places where the process can go wrong and unsafe food can slip through the cracks.
The broken commercial chain leads to the third problem that scholars highlight,
central government regulation. Central government regulatory measures for food safety
are highly fragmented and hence are considered to be ineffective. As many as thirteen
different ministries and agencies are responsible for some element of food safety
regulation. By contrast in the United States, a similarly large agricultural giant, only two
agencies, the FDA and the USDA, are responsible for food safety regulation and
implementation. The FDA controls all but two industries, meat and poultry, which are
regulated by the USDA. This allows for laws and regulations to be uniform and easier to
follow since there is only one regulation, not many regulations and regulatory agencies
acting on the same item in different ways. 20 China’s system of regulation, broken over so
many different agencies and ministries allows for more mistakes, weaker regulations, and
unclear and overlapping jurisdictions. When the power to declare certain foods fit to eat
is given to multiple ministries, the consumer can be faced with an extremely confusing
situation and retailers will not know which foods are safe to sell. For example, when
cancer-causing chemicals were found to be in vermicelli, the General Administration of
Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (GAQSIQ) declared 30 brands of
vermicelli fit for consumption, but the Ministry of Health (MoH) only listed 7 brands fit

19

Sun Zhe. (2011, June 1). When medievalism meets the modern marketplace. News
China, 20.
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(2011, Sep. 6). Food Safety is Still a Critical Issue in China. China Daily.
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for consumption.21 The consumer was given the task of deciding which ministry was
more trustworthy, and stores were not forced to remove certain brands since it was on one
of the ministries’ lists. Furthermore, the multiple regulatory agencies create a slow flow
of information since many of the agencies are competitive and refuse to work together
and the fragmented system allows blame to be passed around without officially blaming
any one agency or individual. 22
Another element increasing the fragmentation of the regulatory system in China is
the food safety laws that give each ministry its regulatory duties. China did not have a
strict food safety law until after the melamine incident in 2008. Prior to the Food and
Safety Law, passed in 2009, China’s only law regulating food safety was the Food
Hygiene Law of the People’s Republic of China of 1995.23 This law was related to food
safety, but spread the regulatory power to many different agencies as described above.
The first law targeted directly at issues of food safety was the Food and Safety Law,
instituted as a result of the melamine food scandal in 2008. This law attempted to
streamline the regulatory process, but its power is also spread over many ministries and
agencies in the government. It created the State Council Food Safety Commission, a
commission that focuses on food additives, edible farm products and food processing, but
the power of this commission is again hindered by the fragmentation of the system. None
of the ministries or agencies wants to relinquish control over their areas of focus or the
added revenue of regulation, maintaining the system of fragmentation that exists today.
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Tam Weikeung, and Yang Dali. (2005). Food Safety and the Development of
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Regulatory agencies also need to implement a plan to educate farmers about safe
farming practices. The changing levels of food consumption described above have caused
a proportional change in production fostering a change in the methods of production. The
methods that the farmers use are not always safe, but most farmers are uneducated and do
not know what safe farming practices are. In order to be competitive, small-scale farmers
have to adopt possibly unsafe measures to increase their output. In pig farming for
example, farmers used to feed their pigs homemade slop made of grain, yams and other
waste food around the house. Today, most pigs are fed corn and soy meal mixed with
additives that supposedly speed growth.24 In the past, farmers kept pigs for a year or more
to reach a weight of around 80 kilograms. Now after only four or five months of growth,
a pig can weigh as much as 100 kilograms.25 Organic and locally grown feeding methods
have disappeared and farmers have to use modern tactics to compete with other farmers.
There has also been an increase in the use of drugs to keep animals alive, or stimulate and
enhance their growth. Antibiotics are used to combat or prevent diseases, and stimulants
such as clenbuterol are used to add meat to the body of a pig, enhancing the leanness of
the meat, without a thought being given to how these drugs will affect the humans who
consume the meat.26 Many of these additives have been around for years, but no one has
educated the farmers about the harm that the additives can cause. For example, many
farmers receive their pig feed from a company and they are told that this feed will make
the pigs leaner. After hearing this the farmers do not question why the feed makes pigs
24

Sun Zhe. (2011, June 1). When medievalism meets the modern marketplace. News
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26
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leaner because the farmer receives more money when the pigs are leaner. In the case of
milk, farmers admit that “protein powder” of unclear origin was added to milk for years
before the scandal was discovered in 2008.27 In the United States the USDA is
responsible for educating farmers about safe farming practices, but in China the agencies
seem to have ignored the problem. Regulatory agencies need to take responsibility not
only for the food, but also for the farmers and educate them on safe farming practices.
Finally, scholars argue that food safety problems have proliferated because
implementation of the existing laws is very weak. Implementation of regulations is weak
not only because of the fragmentation of the regulatory system mentioned above but also
because of the difficulty of implementing national rules and laws on a local level. The
Chinese government is highly bureaucratic and is organized in many layers. It runs from
central to provincial, to city, to prefecture, to county, to town or township and so on. It is
difficult for leaders on the central and provincial levels to make the leaders on the town
and township levels follow the rules set by the central government. The local government
often has closer ties to the local community than to the central government, so it is less
likely to listen to the central government if their actions benefit the local community. As
stated earlier, farming in China is highly dispersed and the farms are small, usually just
over an acre and employ 10 or fewer people. Therefore the central government must rely
on the local government to enforce laws and regulations. Enforcing these regulations can
be difficult because if the illegal practices gain more money for the town, the local
official is less likely to enforce the regulation because it damages the local economy and

27
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hurts the local official’s evaluations by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
Furthermore revenue generation is often more important than food safety regulations
which can limit local growth.28 Corruption at the local level is also a large problem. Local
officials often overlook violations when personal bribes are offered and, in order to create
more revenue for the region, local regulatory agencies will frequently fine businesses
instead of halting their practices when a violation is discovered.29 Additionally, since
manufacturer’s products are usually sent from the rural areas where the products are
produced to urban areas where the products are consumed, local officials are less likely to
crack down on individuals or businesses that produce fake or substandard goods if it is
not affecting the local people. The melamine scandal that set off a wide range of food
safety inquiries began at the local level where melamine was added to the milk, long
before it reached the processing center.30 Therefore local level implementation and
federal implementation need to improve in order for there to be progress.

FOUR SOLUTIONS
Scholars also propose four solutions that align directly with solving the four
problems: transform Chinese agriculture, restructure agricultural commercial
organization, streamline the regulatory bureaucracy, and improve local implementation.
First, some scholars suggest that farms must be reformed so that safer practices are
encouraged and so that regulation becomes easier. Most officials and many Chinese

28

Tam Weikeung and Yang Dali. (2005). Food Safety and the Development of
Regulatory Institutions in China. Asian Perspective, 29(4), 17.
29
Ibid. 20.
30
Yu Xiaodong. (2001, June 1). Farmers, corporations, and the government: Who’s to
Blame? News China, 15.
12

scholars argue that the only option that would improve farming methods in China is
horizontal integration, taking all of the small farms and combining them based on the
American agribusiness form. Farms in the United States are large and mechanized with
few workers. The average size of a farm in America is 418 acres per farm, 400 times the
average size of farms in China.31 Scholars argue that more urbanization and the removal
of farmers from land to cities would allow for the creation of large-scale farms similar to
American farms and complete the modernization of China.32 Officials and scholars argue
for large scale farms not only for the continued modernization of China, but also because
large-scale farms would be easier to regulate than small farms since there would be fewer
and they would not be as dispersed. Processors could assume that all the raw materials
coming from each farm would be of the same quality and would only need to test a
sample of the goods in order to determine their quality. In theory creating a large scale
agribusiness system would be much easier to regulate, but in practice it would not only be
hard to transform the current agricultural system, but it would also potentially harm the
farmers, whom they are ostensibly attempting to help. In India for example, privatization
of land has resulted in not only many farmers losing their land, but also a large class of
urban poor.33 Furthermore there are only six countries in the entire world with an
agricultural policy based on large-scale farming methods.34 In China, where small-scale
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farming has dominated for centuries, the creation of large-scale agribusiness would be
extremely complex and potentially impossible to complete.
The second solution offered by scholars and officials is to restructure commerce
from production to consumption, so that regulation is easier and consumers know where
their food originates. One solution offered by the Ministry of Commerce is an electronic
tracking system at grocery stores. 35 The system is currently still in testing stages, but is
fully in effect in 10 cities in China. The system tracks meat and vegetables from farm to
store and consumers can check where the food has come from by scanning the barcode at
the store. This tracking system is one of the Chinese government’s solutions to the food
safety problem and they plan to have it instituted throughout the entire country by the end
of the 12th five-year-plan.
Another possible method of restructuring commerce is to streamline vertical
integration, the process from farm to store. Three main options have been offered;
“dragon-head” enterprises such as Sanlu, specialty co-ops, or independently owned farms
and processing enterprises.36 A “dragon-head” enterprise is one large company that
collects goods from small farms, and processes and markets them, which so far seems to
be the norm in China. Cooperative organizations on the other hand are a coalition of
farmers that control production, processing and marketing. This is different from the
“dragon-head” enterprises because the farmers are all part owners of the cooperative and
there are safeguards built into the cooperative that protect farmers against an adverse
market environment. Cooperatives are more appealing to farmers, because they receive a
35
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larger portion of the profits, but it is uncertain if all the farmers will actually have a voice
in each cooperative or whether it will act more like a “dragon-head” enterprise. The final
option is the easiest to control, because in this option the processing centers have their
own farms. The structure is similar to the “dragon-head” enterprise, but the enterprise
owns and cares for its own farm. This method is being touted as the most secure method
of farming because the enterprise has the most control over product quality and product
safety. According to scholars, the most effective solution and future outcome will be a
continuous mix of the three systems.37
A third solution offered by scholars is that government regulations should be
streamlined in order to make regulatory measures possible and avoid conflict between
ministries. Currently the multiple regulatory agencies all act in similar, if not the same,
fields. This creates confusion, multiple regulations for the same product, and a system
where it is easy to escape blame. The Chinese government has attempted to make
changes in regulatory agencies and streamline the process since 2008. The new Food and
Safety Law in 2009 was the first attempt at stricter food safety measures. According to
the new regulations, no food can be sold inspection-free and food manufacturers are
responsible for all recalls of food items. All additives must be approved, and there are
now harsher penalties on violations of the food safety law. 38 But as mentioned above,
this has not done much to stop food safety scandals and violations. In order to effectively
regulate food safety, the government must either create a new food safety agency and
strip existing agencies of their regulatory powers, or agencies responsible for food safety
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regulations must have more outlined and specific responsibilities. Currently the room for
ambiguity within the law prevents effective regulation and many scholars think that
China missed its chance for an effective regulatory system by passing the Food and
Safety Law without clearly defined regulatory provisions.39
The final possible solution to the food safety issues in China is to improve
implementation at the local level by local officials. Currently the only solution for
improving implementation of regulation is harsher punishments for violators of
regulations. Punishments have increased from days in jail to years in jail and the
strongest punishment is death.40 In recent months thousands of producers and processors
have been arrested and questioned regarding their role in the contamination of goods, but
harsher punishments are not the solution. The Chinese media and authorities mark these
changes as a sign of improvement in the implementation and praise the government for
these changes, but it is actually a sign of weak implementation since if the government
was implementing the laws effectively, there would be fewer violations. In order to
improve local implementation, China will have to change the way it reviews the work of
the local level officials. Reviews of local officials given the task of regulating food safety
should be based on the number of farms, manufacturers, and processors that pass food
safety inspections. Fining individuals or companies and therefore gaining more money
for the region should not be rewarded unless the fine results in an actual change in the
actions of that individual or company. Evaluations should also look to discourage bribery
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and corruption, although it is a problem throughout the Chinese government. This level
of local implementation is both one of the largest problems facing the improvement of
food safety in China and possibly one of the hardest problems to solve.

CASE STUDIES
Through the examination of two industries, dairy and pork, the proposed causes
and subsequent solutions will be examined. Dairy and pork make good case studies
because of the importance of each industry in China and past food safety issues that have
recently occurred. Dairy, although it has not always been a popular industry in China, is
currently growing exponentially and is becoming extremely important in the Chinese
diet. Consumption of dairy, like many other foods in China, is increasing rapidly, as the
income of the Chinese increases and the Chinese diet continues to change.41 In the past,
milk was only used to feed the young and the elderly since it is full of important nutrients
that are necessary for the health of the young and old. But as incomes increase, more
Chinese are consuming dairy. The increase in consumption of milk in developing
countries is a worldwide phenomenon, but in China the production and consumption
increased exponentially from 8 million tons in 2000 to 36 million tons 8 years later.42 It is
a luxury they can now afford.
As described above, the dairy industry has also faced many safety scandals and
was the impetus for change in the regulatory system. Melamine was not the first scandal
in the dairy industry. As mentioned above, the incident in 2003 caused the deaths of 12
41
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babies and severe cases of malnutrition in others, but there were no actions taken to
prevent similar incidents in the future.43 Before the melamine scandal in 2008 the leading
dairy companies were not required to undergo testing although there was a history of
unsafe products in that industry. At the end of December 2011 another safety issue in the
Chinese dairy industry was uncovered. Mengniu, one of China’s leading dairy industries,
and Changfu Dairy Company in Fujian were found to have milk contaminated with
carcinogenic toxins caused by moldy cattle feed. The milk came from a Mengniu
subsidiary company in Meishan, Sichuan and from Changfu’s dairies in Fujian.44 This
milk never made it to the market since it was caught in government spot testing before
being sold by retailers, but it has shaken the already fragile trust that the Chinese people
have in the Chinese dairy industry.45 Mengniu claimed that this toxin was allowed into
the milk by mistake and that normally the company tests for this toxin, but the testing
equipment for this toxin is usually 4,000 to 6,000 yuan per unit and therefore many dairy
companies do not actually test for this toxin.46 This is not Mengniu first safety issue of
the year; in November high levels of bacteria were found in Mengniu’s ice cream
products and in April 251 students fell ill after drinking Mengniu milk in their cafeteria.47
These scandals have decreased sales for Chinese dairy companies and have increased
sales for foreign dairy companies hurting a potentially important domestic industry.
Dairy, because of its growing importance in China and because of the multiple scandals,
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is a highly desired commodity with an unsafe history, making it not only an interesting
case study, but also important for an inspection of China’s food safety.
Pork, on the other hand, is a staple meat in Chinese cuisine and although the
production of other meat products has grown, pork remains the most commonly
consumed meat in all of China.48 The Chinese prefer pork to other meats and in many
dishes there is some form of pork. The Chinese character for meat is the character for
pork, for it to be beef or chicken another character must be added. The pork industry has
more recently been investigated for food safety issues. This past April it was discovered
that a subsidiary of Shuanghui, the largest meat processor in China, was found to have
clenbuterol-tainted pork.49 Also known as “lean meat powder”, clenbuterol is fed to pigs
in order to decrease the fat content of the meat and therefore increase the value of the
meat. Clenbuterol is a stimulant that is used illegally as a steroid and as a weight loss
agent in many countries. Some countries also use clenbuterol in asthma medicine, but
clenbuterol in all forms is illegal in the United States.50 In China, clenbuterol is illegal in
animal feed since once ingested by humans it can cause dizziness, heart palpitations and
profuse sweating in humans; some studies even link long-term consumption to cancer.51
The clenbuterol was found in pig feed, which is usually given to farmers by
manufacturers, who tell the farmers that the feed will make the pigs grow faster and make
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their meat leaner. Farmers earn more money the leaner their meat is, so they do not ask
questions. Since this incident occurred more than three years after the melamine milk
scandal, this case study is revealing as a way to analyze the changes since the scandal and
why the methods of regulation are still ineffective.
By examining data specific to each case study, the flaws in the regulation of each
industry will be examined. In order to determine whether the structure of farming in
China impedes regulation of agriculture in China, the geographic dispersion and size of
farms in each respective industry will be examined through raw census and agricultural
data, and through reports on the ratio of small farms to large scale farms and the
percentage of goods that come from each farm. By examining these data, the true
structure of farming in each industry will be uncovered and the effect of farming structure
on regulation will be examined. Then, using reports on the past, current and potential
structures of commerce, including those on the existing major companies or dragon-head
enterprises in each industry, a broader picture of commerce in China will be examined
and possible flaws and solutions will be laid out. In order to examine whether fragmented
regulation is responsible for the flaws of regulation in each industry, laws governing
regulation of industry, ministries in charge of each industry, and the role of education of
farmers in each industry will be studied. Finally, in order to investigate local levels of
implementation, newspaper articles will be examined for stories of lack of local
implementation or trials and subsequent sentencing of local officials during food safety
scandals. This information will provide greater perspective on how local implementation
works and how it can be improved.
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Food safety is a problem plaguing China as they modernize and develop into a
fully industrialized and developed country. Using these case studies this thesis will
examine the proposed causes in the context of each industry and determine whether the
causes are valid in each case. In this thesis I hope to uncover the root causes of food
safety issues in China and what China can do to improve its food safety record and
prevent more deadly food scandals from occurring. The first chapter will examine
China’s agricultural structure, and propose solutions to this side of food safety concerns.
The second chapter will expose China’s agricultural commercial structure and examine
ways in which this structure can be improved. The third and final chapter will expose
flaws in China’s regulatory system, examine how it can become stronger, explain China’s
implementation flaws and discuss what can be done to fix these problems. After
examining these four main issues the true problems will be identified and possible
solutions will be proposed.
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CHAPTER ONE: AGRICULTURAL STRUCTURE
INTRODUCTION
Many Chinese scholars and officials blame food safety issues on the structure of
farming in China. Currently, the agricultural system in China is highly dispersed and
based on small scale farms, which makes it hard to physically regulate. Most farms are
run by families with less than ten workers and on less than one acre of land.52 This has
been the method of farming in China for hundreds of years and has been reinforced by
the more recent household responsibility system, which divides land usage among all the
families in each village. Although the urban population recently surpassed the rural
population for the first time in all of Chinese history reaching 51.27%, the rural
population is still extremely large. 53 Therefore each plot of land farmed by each family is
extremely small. This structure is hard to physically regulate so scholars argue for
horizontal integration of farms, or restructuring farms to create large scale farms in order
to improve regulation. Scholars argue this structure, based on the American large scale
agribusiness model would be much easier to regulate and would improve overall food
safety, but raw data shows otherwise.54 Most agricultural processing companies do
receive their raw materials from smaller farms, but commercial ties between small scale
farmers and large processing companies create a larger commercially connected network
that should be easier to regulate. Therefore the American large scale model would be
redundant and cause more harm than good.
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The model that Chinese scholars believe China needs to emulate, the American
agribusiness model, is based on large scale farms owned by individuals and large
companies that grow the majority of crops and raise the majority of livestock in the
United States. Scholars argue that this method of farming would be easier to regulate
because there would be fewer farms, therefore less manpower would be need to inspect
the farms. 55 Furthermore the farms would be more industrialized and have more modern
production. Therefore, food would theoretically be safer. Although the system might be
easier to regulate, the creation of this system would be very difficult. Currently there are
only six countries in the entire world with large scale agribusiness farming structure; the
rest of the world still depends on small scale local farming.56 In the United States most of
these large scale farms are corporate farms, owned by the companies, not the farmers
themselves and the size of each farm is monumental; the average size of farms in the
United States is 418 acres, 400 times the size of Chinese farms.57
The United States’ agricultural system is vastly different from China’s
agricultural system, but it is not as uniform as many Chinese scholars and officials would
like others to believe. Most agricultural sales in the United States do come from large
scale agribusiness farms, but the majority of farms are categorized as small; farms with
100 or less heads of livestock are categorized as small in the United States, but would be
large farms in China. In the dairy industry, almost 50% of farms are categorized as small
with less than 50 heads of cattle. And farms with less than 100 heads of cattle make up
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about 70% of the farms.58 These small farms are numerous, but 81% of sales come from
24% of the businesses that tend to be corporate owned.59 In the pork industry there is a
similar trend with 6% of the farms, corporate farms, accounting for 33% of the sales, and
family run farms, although they account for 85% of the farms, only account for 44% of
the sales.60 The USDA and FDA have to regulate both the small farms as well as the large
farms. The US model of corporate farming, therefore, could solve some of China’s
regulatory problems, but not even the United States has an entirely corporate farming
based agriculture.
The United States’ system, although theoretically useful, would not only be
difficult to carry out, but could also hurt the farmers and damage the agricultural industry.
As mentioned in the introduction, India attempted to change its agricultural system after
the corporate farming model and the result was a large number of landless peasants who
moved to the cities and created the vast slums surrounding most cities in India.61 If China
decided to transform its agricultural system it would possibly end in a similar result.
Creation of a large agribusiness system of agriculture would necessitate the removal of
peasants that currently farm the land.62 China has already experienced the removal and
transplantation of large numbers of rural people such as during the creation of the Three
Gorges Dam. Millions of people were moved from their ancestral homes and forced to
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move thousands of miles away. Repercussions from this project are still being dealt with
today. Logistically, the transformation to this system would be very difficult. Given this
information, creation of a Chinese system similar to that of the United States’ would be
very complicated.
The argument that agricultural reform will be able to improve food safety needs to
be examined from an empirical standpoint in order to determine the effect agricultural
reform would have on food safety. As outlined in the introduction, the geographic
dispersion and size of farms will be examined through raw census and agricultural data,
reports on the ratio of small farms to large scale farms, and the percentage of goods that
come from each farm will be examined in order to discover the true agricultural structure
in China. Two case studies, the dairy and pork industries, are best suited for this
inspection because of recent problems in each industry. Furthermore the two industries
are good for comparison due to their respective histories in China; dairy is a relatively
new industry while the pork industry is ancient. By examining these data specific to dairy
and pork, the true structure of farming in each industry will be uncovered, the effect of
farming structure on regulation will be examined, and proposed solutions will be
analyzed.

DAIRY
Dairy production in China is on the rise. According to the China Statistical
Yearbook, from 1995 to 2009 production of milk increased from 6,728,000 tons to
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37,326,000 tons.63 China is also the world’s third largest producer of fresh milk, a recent
development, as China became one of the top ten producers of milk only ten years ago.64
Dairy is a fairly new industry in China, that has benefited both from governmental and
foreign support and has expanded greatly in the past decade, but China’s consumption of
milk per capita is much below that of Western countries.65 This could be attributed to
lactose intolerance, which is very common in China, a large poor rural population that
cannot always afford milk, and the comparative inefficiency of China’s dairy farms.66
The dairy industry has grown exponentially as consumption and popularity of dairy
increased and is still expanding as foreign companies enter the market. This booming
industry has been plagued with breaches of safety regulations such as the melamine
scandal of 2008 and the more recent issues with Mengniu in December of 2011. This has
lead to general mistrust of the entire industry and to larger food safety questions such as
why does the dairy industry appear to have the most food safety issues in China.
Therefore the dairy industry is important to analyze because of its increasing popularity
and because of its poor safety record.
The dairy industry is a relatively new industry in China. Before the economic
reform and opening up of China in 1978, farmers were told to farm few crops, but in the
1980s agricultural restrictions loosened and farms were decollectivized. The rural
agricultural communes that had dominated Chinese agriculture did raise production from
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1950 to 1980, but left little room for rapid economic growth. The goal of the new system
was to encourage individual agricultural growth and gave all farmers their own land to
work on. Farmers were encouraged to diversify their crops and livestock. During this
time dairy farming was strongly encouraged in Northern China, which has resulted in
fairly localized production.
The provinces that consistently produce the most milk are Hebei, Inner Mongolia
and Heilongjiang.67 These provinces, along with parts of Shandong and Xinjiang are what
make up China’s growing “dairy belt,” responsible for most dairy production in China as
can be seen in the map below.68 In 2006, milk produced in Inner Mongolia, Heilongjiang,
and Hebei accounted for half of the total milk output in all of China.69 The geography of
Northern China (Inner Mongolia, Heilongjiang and Northern Hebei) is characterized by
large, cold and largely unpopulated grasslands, ideal conditions for grazing of cattle. The
Chinese government has been encouraging the development of the dairy industry in this
mostly agriculturally underdeveloped region as a way to utilize the land, increase dairy
production, and increase rural incomes.70
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Figure 1: Production of milk per region in China in 200971

Governmental encouragement of the dairy industry in Northern China began in
the 1980s.72 This area did not have a strong agricultural industry and the geography
appeared to be well suited to dairy farming. Local governments provided aid and
subsidies to dairy farmers in order to encourage an increase in production. The Inner
Mongolia provincial government even listed dairy processing production as the top
agricultural priority for the entire autonomous region. Furthermore, “the governments of
Shijiazhuang City and Tangshan City in Hebei province perceived the dairy industry as a
pillar for development in general.” 73 Methods such as reducing taxes, decreasing
regulations, and increasing loans to dairy companies greatly encouraged the production of
dairy in the region. These governmental encouragements have created the “dairy belt” in
Northern China. Although Beijing and Shanghai are also centers of dairy production,
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most major dairy companies are centered in Northern China in Hohhot in Inner
Mongolia, Harbin in Heilongjiang province, and Shijiazhuang and Tangshan in Hebei
province. In 2005 these four cities produced nearly 40% of dairy in China with 70
different dairy enterprises.
Table 1: Liquid Milk and Dairy Products - Top Ten Cities by Sales Revenue74
No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Cities
Hohhot City
Shijiazhuang City
Shanghai
Harbin City
Beijing
Guangzhou City
Qiqihar City
Tangshan City
Xi'an City
Changsha City

Province
InnerMongolia
Hebei
Shanghai
Heilongjiang
Beijing
Guangdong
Heilongjiang
Hebei
Shaanxi
Hunan

Market Share(%)
17.02
9.97
7.20
5.53
3.76
2.71
2.62
2.37
2.26
2.01

Number of Enterprises
7
13
16
16
19
10
17
17
9
7

Hohhot, the capital of Inner Mongolia, is the main hub of dairy production in
Northern China. Home to two of the largest dairy companies in China, Mengniu and Yili,
Hohhot is the fast growing dairy capital of China. From 1992 to 2006 production of
cow’s milk in Hohhot alone increased from 35,447 tons to 2,277,884 tons.75 New dairies
are built constantly and surrounding the city are thousands of small dairy farms. The
China Dairy Association Headquarters is in Hohhot and the International Dairy Expo is
being held in Hohhot this year.76 The dairy industry is even considered one of the main
six industrial interests of the city due to the economic success of Mengnui and Yili.77
Furthermore, Hohhot also has the largest concentration of dairy cows compared to any
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other city in China and Hohhot’s leading dairy companies, Mengniu and Yili, account for
almost a third of all milk production in China.78
The concentrated production center of dairy, Hohhot, has its own concentrated
centers of production. Dairy farming in this instance is not highly dispersed. Dairy
production within the city of Hohhot is centered around 3 main areas in the city: Saihan
city district, Horinger county, and Tumote Zuoqi Banner. Mengniu is based in Horinger
county and Yili is based in Tumote Zuoqi Banner which accounts for their high level of
production. Saihan city district has a higher level of dairy production because it is the
most spacious district with the lowest population density leaving room for farming dairy
cows. Mengniu and Yili, the two largest dairy companies in China get much of their milk
from these districts, but also have milking stations throughout the country where local
farmers go to milk the cows. From those stations, the milk is then sent to the large
processing centers in Hohhot. The individual cows that are the source of Mengniu and
Yili’s milk are raised mostly in smaller scale farms, but the milk is all sent to a central
location creating a hub and spoke structure of agriculture. This system creates a central
processing center where most milk in the region goes to two or three enterprises and is
then processed. Although the two companies use dairy from farms throughout the
country, the commercial vertical integration creates a central, not dispersed, production
center.
The farming structure in Hohhot is replicated throughout the areas of China with
vast natural grassland where dairy farms depend on grazing. In the eastern section of
China cows are primarily kept in backyard sheds and are fed more grain. Dairy farms
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around cities, such as Bright Dairy, use more modern technology and are fairly large
scale.79 Although large scale dairies do exist, over 90% of all farms have less than 20
cows and are located in a small household, or “backyard farms.”80 In 2009 there were
5,820 farms with over 200 cows that accounted for 0.24% of total farms.81 There are
many more small farms than large farms, but the number of large farms has been growing
as can be seen in the table below. In 2003 farms with 20 cows or less accounted for
almost all farms in the country and for 72.6% of the total output. In 2009 the number of
small farms had decreased significantly, but more importantly, the output of large farms
increased and the output of small farms decreased to 57.4% of the total output.
Table 2: Size Distribution of China Dairy Farms in 201082

These statistics point to a change in the structure of dairy farming in China. Small
farms are still the norm in dairy farming, but the number of large scale farms are growing
and their output is growing even faster. The trend for larger farms is most popular in
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cities where the dairy companies have their own farms, but most dairy companies still get
the raw milk from small scale local farmers. The dairy farms that utilized small scale
farms also tend to control the economic and commercial supply chain and are vertically
integrated. Vertical integration is becoming extremely popular and useful as it gives dairy
processing companies more control throughout the dairy production process. However,
local governments are also beginning to give incentives to large farms surrounding cities
creating larger farms.
Given this information, scholars’ arguments for agricultural reform are tenuous.
Scholars argue that farming in China is too dispersed for proper regulation, but data in the
dairy industry shows that this argument does not apply. The Chinese dairy industry is
fairly concentrated in Northern China. The majority of dairy is produced and processed in
Northern China as well. This regional concentration refutes the argument that widespread
farms are the cause of food safety issues because dairy farms are highly concentrated in
Northern China. Another factor listed by scholars is the size of each farm. Most dairy
farms in China are very small with less than 20 cows, but these dairy farms are also
commercially connected with large dairy companies. The milking stations in rural
villages when there is “backyard” farming, are owned by these companies. Commercial
vertical integration of each farm creates a larger commercially connected network, that
acts like a large scale farm.
Therefore, since the small farms are connected to larger dairy processing
companies, widespread horizontal integration of farms, or the creation of large scale
farms, would be unnecessary. Dairy farms are effectively already large scale
commercially. Very few dairy farmers sell directly to the market and nearly all dairy is
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processed by these large processing companies. Dairy, as a regionally concentrated
industry with vertical commercial integration does not fit the profile for agricultural
reform that many scholars argue for. This can be attributed to the relative youth of the
industry. The Chinese government has been able to plan the production of milk and has
had a greater hand in its growth as an industry. This has allowed the dairy industry to be
structured as it is today.

PORK
The production of pork on the other hand, is widespread and fairly consistent
throughout the country. Pork is the most commonly produced agricultural good in China
and has been a staple in the Chinese diet for many years. China is the largest producer of
pork with Chinese production of pork accounting for 47% of the world’s production of
pork.83 Pigs have been a domesticated farm animal in China as early as the Han
Dynasty.84 More recent studies have shown that domesticated pigs originated in China
indicating that pig farming could have an even longer history, around 10,000 years.85 Pigs
are attractive as farm animals because they are fairly self-sufficient and require little
tending. Pigs were even used until fairly recently as sewer systems through pig toilets and
garbage disposals; they were responsible for eating human refuse and feces. The average
farmer could raise pigs based on the scraps of their meals or their crops. The ease of pig
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farming combined with the long history of pig farming in China has led to production of
pork in nearly every province with relatively equal outputs.
Over the past 14 years production of pork in China has also been consistent.
There has been a gradual increase from 480,510,000 tons of pork to 645,386,000 tons of
pork.86 There were some fluctuations in those years, but there has been a general upward
trend. This upward trend however is rather slow, compared to the production of milk, and
is accommodating only the growth of the population and the changing Chinese diet. As
mentioned in the introduction, as the income of the Chinese people rises, their
consumption habits are changing leading to a diet based more on meat, milk and other
fattier foods. This has caused a general increase in the production of pork, but because it
is not a new industry like milk, the increase in production can only be attributed to
increase in population and change in diets, not to growing popularity.
Although production of pork is rather uniform across the country, there are some
areas of China where the production of pork is greater. Pork production is most frequent
in South and Central China and the provinces with the highest levels of production are
Sichuan, Henan, and Hunan province.87 These provinces are all traditional agricultural
bases in China; Sichuan has historically been known as the “Province of Abundance”
because of its agricultural strength. Additionally Sichuan and Henan provinces are also
the fourth and third most populous provinces, respectively. Therefore these three
provinces have the highest production of pork in the country. Additionally, Shuanghui
Group, the largest meat processing company in the nation, is headquartered in Luohe,

86

China Data Service. (1995-2009). Statistical Yearbook: Agriculture, Livestock Output.
1995-2009. China Data Service. Retrieved from http://chinadataonline.org.
87
Ibid.
34

Henan, which is famous for its ham production. Although these three provinces have the
highest production of pork, you can still see in the map below that production of pork is
fairly high in every province.
Figure 2: Number of pigs slaughtered per region in China in 200988

The uniformity of pork production in China can be attributed to the history of the
industry as well as the prevalence of pork in Chinese cuisine. Compared to the hub and
spoke structure of milk, the production of pork is much more widespread across the
country. Pork is an old industry in China and therefore has been based on small scale
family farms, farms with less than 50 heads of hogs, for most of China’s history.
However, recently more large scale farming and processing companies have started up in
China. These farms are considered large if they have 50 or more heads of hogs. From
1995 to 1999 the share of large scale farms rose from 13.6% to 21.5% and after 2000,
many backyard farming households withdrew from the industry due to the rising costs of
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pork farming and the low cost of pork.89 Therefore a rising percentage of large scale
farms has increased to fill the void. Large scale farms still only produce 40% of all pork
in the country. Most of the small scale farms in China no longer sell their pigs
independently instead they work with larger companies who supply the feed, medicine
and technology and then eventually process the pigs.90 Even the small scale farms are still
connected to the large scale farms through integration of small scale with large
businesses.
Table 3: Production by large-scale farmer (50 head or above per year sloughed)91

Large scale pork farms are on the rise because of the rising costs of pork
production. Pig feed, medicine, and other costs are becoming too expensive for small
scale farmers to afford. Large scale farms can lower their cost per pig because they have
so many pigs. Many companies now control from the farm to the store; Shuanghui even
has its own supermarket, Shineway, where it can sell all of its goods. These companies
also utilize small farms. In the pork industry, like the dairy industry, small farms still outnumber and out-produce the large scale farms. These small farms are vertically integrated
into the larger commercial system, combining large scale production with small farms.
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Although pig farming is widespread, the production of pork is vertically
integrated, often by region commercially centralizing the industry. Like the dairy
industry, this commercial vertical integration creates a system where horizontal
integration is unnecessary. Fully industrialized large scale farms would not only be
unnecessary for improving food safety, but would also harm the small farmers that
dominate agriculture today. Pork is an older industry in China and therefore is much
more scattered and widespread throughout the country, but its connections to larger
processing companies creates a large horizontal structure.

CONCLUSION
The commercial vertical integration and growing numbers of large scale farms in
the dairy and pork industries renders the proposed solution of agricultural horizontal
integration inapplicable. Although the dairy and pork industries have different geographic
and agricultural structures, the commercial and economic structures are very similar. The
dairy industry does rely on more small farms than the pork industry, but both use a
similar structure of vertical integration where the small farmers are connected
commercially to larger processing companies. In dairy, small farmers rely on milking
stations built and owned by companies such as Mengniu and Yili. That milk is later sent
to these companies for processing. In the pork industry feed, medicine and technology are
provided by the company that will eventually buy, slaughter, and process the pig.
This structure of commercial vertical integration acts very similar to horizontal
integration and makes agricultural reform redundant. The current system already acts like
large scale farming and agricultural reform would do more harm than good. Therefore it
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appears that the structure of farming is not at fault. Dairy and pork both travel from small
farms to the large processor. This large processor has the responsibility to inspect the
goods and evaluate their safety. Therefore it is necessary to examine the commercial
structure to see if there is a gap in the chain from farm to store that allows for food safety
issues.
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CHAPTER TWO: COMMERCIAL STRUCTURE
INTRODUCTION
A second potential flaw on the path to food safety in China is the commercial
structure of agriculture; how the raw goods get from farm to store. The structure of
commerce in China is highly fragmented; therefore scholars argue that the process from
production to consumption should be streamlined in order to ensure regulation and
safety.92 Currently, in most industries the path from farm to processing center involves
many middlemen creating multiple areas for problems and mistakes. This is partially
related to the agricultural structure described in chapter one; large processing companies
have to rely on small farms for their raw goods. Therefore from small farm to large
processing center there are many stages. All of the stages need to be regulated creating
more work for the regulatory agencies. Regulating the farm, the middlemen and the large
company can require too much manpower and be difficult to accomplish. This is a
problem because in both the dairy and pork industries, most safety issues have occurred
before the milk or pork entered the processing center due to the negligence or
malevolence of the middlemen. In 2008 for example, during the melamine scandal,
melamine was added by the middlemen at the milking stations in order to increase their
profit. The middlemen in this circumstance were not well supervised and therefore had
the opportunity to add additives to the milk without being noticed. Given this information
commercial structure needs to be streamlined or adapted in order to improve regulation of
agriculture and therefore improve food safety.
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Currently there are three main forms of agricultural commercial structure in
China. Large scale enterprises, or dragon-head enterprises, which are connected to the
small scale farmers, or commerce; cooperative organizations that connect from farm to
store; and independent large companies that own their own farms and livestock. Dragonhead enterprises are large scale businesses that are currently dominating Chinese
agriculture. As described in chapter one, these large scale businesses are linked to small
farms that provide the raw materials for processing. For example, a small farmer owns
the pig, but feed, medicine, and technology all come from the main dragon-head
processing company. The structure is preferred by central and local governments as can
be seen through increased subsidies to large scale dragon-head enterprises.93 The
government probably supports this system because it best follows the pattern of
modernizing agriculture in China. Large technologically advanced processing companies
are seen to be the future of Chinese agriculture, so the government supports the growth of
these businesses. It is also the most common and popular structure for both dairy and
pork as large processing companies dominate both industries. Dairy companies such as
Mengniu, Sanyuan, and Yili and pork processing companies such as Shuanghui and
Zhengbang are all large scale and rely on small farmers for their goods. Although this
structure is the most popular and is preferred by the government, it also has the history of
the most safety issues and flaws. The melamine scandal of 2008, the clenbuterol scandal
of April 2011 and the Mengniu safety issues of December 2011 were all partially caused
by flaws in this commercial system.
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The second commercial system is cooperative organizations. These organizations
are owned by members not the enterprise. Therefore the cultivator benefits more in this
system because in dragon-head enterprises most profits go to the enterprise leaving little
for the producer. This system would bring together the entire chain of production:
processing companies, marketing companies and farmers.94 Currently there is no
substantive government support of these organizations, but small cooperative
organizations do exist. In the dairy industry, farmer are slowly becoming more popular.
These cooperatives are very attractive to farmers because it gives the farmer more power
and authority when negotiating prices for their goods. The goal of these organizations is
more power and an increasing income for the farmers, which many cooperatives have
been able to achieve.95
Finally, there are many businesses that are similar in size to dragon-head
enterprises, but instead of relying on small scale farmers for the raw goods, these
companies have their own farms and control all areas of processing from farm to store.
This system is more attractive to many companies because with complete control, the
company can better ensure product quality. This system is slowly becoming more popular
in the dairy industry as large companies buy large plots of land for their cattle. In the pork
industry this system is even more popular. There are also many more governmental
supports for large scale farms such as subsidies and tax breaks that encourage the
construction of large farms.
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Table 4: Numbers of Vertical Integration Entities by Organization Type, 2000-200596

In each of these systems, food safety is an extremely important issue, but each of
these systems alone does not appear to be enough. One solution is the use of technology
to help track the progress from farm to store. These fragmented systems can make it hard
to track where contaminated food comes from. The Ministry of Commerce as well as
outside companies, such as IBM, are working to create systems that would make tracking
of goods much easier. The Ministry of Commerce’s program allows consumers to see
where each individual item is from which makes tracking of problems easier and
therefore increase accountability. IBM is creating food supply management technology,
which would go to the processor and give companies more information on all of their
goods. The goal of this technology is to streamline commercial structure and improve the
safety of all food overall.
Companies have also been responding individually to the food safety crisis by
adjusting their commercial structure. Dragon-head companies that relied entirely on small
scale farmers are now creating a hybrid system. The companies own their own farm and
livestock and also utilize the small farmers. Some companies are even using their
influence to teach local farmers how to best use their land and livestock. These practices
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help improve food safety and work well with local farmers in order to best utilize
resources. They also give the companies more control over the product quality and safety
and increase accountability in the case of more food safety issues.
Of the three main structures described above, the dragon-head structure has the
most flaws, but dominates the commercial structure of agriculture in China. This
structure is the most popular because it utilizes the existing agricultural structure of
China, but there are many other options available to large businesses. Since the history of
food safety issues has been associated with this system, changes need to be made in this
system to improve food safety and food safety regulation. Most structures have been
constructed to work with the current agricultural structure in China, which is dominated
by small farms, but enterprises need to find ways to work with the current structure safely
and optimize safe food production. Both the dairy and pork industries are dominated by
dragon-head enterprises and most of their safety issues have arisen from companies with
this structure. Reports on past, current and potential commercial structures in the dairy
and pork industries have revealed that there are viable alternatives to the dragon-structure
system that can help improve and streamline commercial structure.

DAIRY
Commercial dairy production is divided into three main systems: dragon-head
enterprises that rely on small farmers through milking stations, dairy husbandry areas or
dairy zones supported by either government or large enterprises, and dairy farm
household cooperatives. The majority of dairy is processed by the dragon-head
enterprises. The top 5 dairy companies produce 39.26% of all dairy in China (see Table
5). These companies rely on small farmers for their dairy and build milking stations
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throughout the area where local farmers go twice a day to milk their cows. 97 From there
the milk is then sent to the companies. These milking stations are either corporately
owned by the dragon-head enterprises or are cooperative owned, but frequently the
people who work at the milking stations are merely middlemen. 98 Therefore the dragonhead companies do not have complete control over the stations not only because they are
distanced from the processing centers, but also because they are not well supervised.
Table 5: Top 5 Dairy Processors99

This was the source of the melamine scandal in 2008. Dairy farmers brought their
cows into the milking stations to be milked, but because their milk was low in protein, the
middlemen added melamine to make the protein content appear higher. Protein is
measured at the milking station and when the raw milk reaches the plant. By adding
melamine after the farmers had milked and the cows and sold their milk to the
middleman, the middleman would pay less for the raw milk from the farmer and then
would sell the raw milk with a “higher” protein content to the processing company for a
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higher profit. This was done to increase the cost of the milk and therefore increase the
middlemen’s profit. Inadequate testing at the processing center allowed the milk to reach
the production stage, but the problem originated from the milking stations (see Figure 3).
In this instance the middleman was not connected to the main processing company and
could add the melamine without fear of repercussions. The lack of connection between
the middlemen and the main processing companies, common throughout most dragonhead enterprises, allowed this scandal to happen.
Figure 3: How Melamine was added in the milk supply chain100

Although there is a history of serious flaws associated with this system, most
large dairy companies in China still rely on this commercial structure in order to obtain
their raw product. Both Yili and Mengniu, the top two diary processors in the country,
rely on the milking stations for their product. Mengniu has more than 3000 production
bases and contracts with 3 million farmers.101 The companies are working with the
existing agricultural structure in the way that seems best because it utilizes agricultural
workers that dominate the industry, small farms. However, given the history of this
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structure, companies will need to adapt and change this structure to provide more
accountability for their product quality.
Another popular method used by large companies is dairy husbandry areas or
dairy zones. These zones hold 200-300 cows and sometimes 500-1,000 cows.102 Each
household manages its own cows, but barns and other structures as well as milking and
disease control are controlled and taken care of by the zone. These zones are often
supported with funds from the local governments and by large dairy processing
enterprises. Yili, one of the top dairy companies in China has nearly 200 dairy zones in
Inner Mongolia. 103 These zones are closer to the cooperative model, but are still
monitored and organized by large scale dragon-head enterprises. They seem to have
better standards for safety because the conditions for production are organized and
controlled by the large companies without completely erasing the farmer’s autonomy.
Since this structure is organized and controlled by the company supervision of milking
can be assumed to be better, and product quality can be ensured.
The final system is the dairy farm household cooperative. This system is
relatively new as a law was only passed recently that allowed and encouraged the
creation of farmers’ cooperatives. 104 In this system farmers produce milk individually,
but work together to sell to a larger enterprise as a whole. This gives farmers more power
and authority to negotiate prices. Some local governments are encouraging the
construction of these cooperatives. Theoretically the cooperatives would improve food
safety because the farmers would get a fairer price for their goods and therefore care
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more about the quality of milk. It would also eliminate the middle man as farmers would
be dealing directly with the processing companies, streamlining the process. This is a
slow growing system in China, but one example is Taipingzhuang Dairy Association in
Heilongjiang, which has more than 730 members and 4,200 heads of dairy cows.105
These are the three main systems dominating dairy production in China, but as
safety becomes a more important issue, some companies have begun to use a
combination of these three systems. Mengniu for example has relied on milking stations
for most of its history, but in reaction to the melamine scandal of 2008 has begun to start
its own farms. Currently Mengniu owns 14 dairy farms with more than 10,000 cows each
while also using small farms through milking stations.106 The company-owned farms
were bought and created as a reaction to the melamine safety scandal. By owning their
own farms, Mengniu hopes to be able to better control dairy product quality. Yili also
owns its own farms. According to the Yili website, “Yili is the only dairy product
producer that possesses three major dairy farms in Tianshan of Xinjiang, Hulunbeier and
Xilinguole of Inner Mongolia.”107 Bright Dairy, a Chinese company based in Shanghai,
also owns its own dairy farms. Bright is the third largest dairy processor in the country
with 10 farms and 12,000 cows, but unlike Yili and Mengniu has never had a large safety
scandal. This could be attributed to the fact that Bright Dairy owns and controls its own
farms allowing for greater control of product quality and safety. This mixture of owning
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farms and using rural dairy farmers is becoming more popular as food safety becomes an
important issue because it allows for more control and therefore can improve safety.
Foreign companies have seen these challenges to food safety, and have created
different methods for dealing with China’s agricultural system. Foreign investment in the
dairy industry is also on the rise so this adjustment is very important (see Table 6).
Nestle, who has been investing in China for over two decades, has begun to invest even
more money into the dairy industry after food safety issues with Chinese dairy farms.
These recent scandals could benefit Nestle since Chinese consumers are buying more
foreign products, assuming that they are safer. Nestle is now investing $396 million in its
dairy enterprises in China and hopes to invest even more over the next three years.108
Using its own hybrid system called the “Milk District” or factory and farmers system
Nestle can better control product quality and safety. These systems are similar to milking
stations, but each station is highly control and monitored by Nestle. Rural farmers bring
their cows to each station and receive technical and medical assistance from Nestle.
Additionally, Nestle is placing importance on education of farmers and offers free
training sessions so that farmers can be relied on to have safe milk.109 By having more
educated farmers who use more modernized methods Nestle hopes to produce the safest
dairy possible.110
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Table 6: Foreign dairy enterprises divided by region in 2009111

District
National Total
Beijing
Tianjin
Hebei
Shanxi
Inner Mongolia
Liaoning
Jilin
Heilongjiang
Shanghai
Jiangsu
Zhejiang
Anhui
Jiangxi
Shandong
Henan
Hubei
Hunan
Guangdong
Hainan
Sichuan
Guizhou
Shaanxi
Ningxia
Xinjiang

Number of
Enterprises (unit)
111
5
4
9
3
11
5
0
15
3
0
0
0
0
13
0
0
4
12
0
3
0
9
0
0

Gross Industrial Output
Value1,000 yuan)
68,035,998
2,879,962
167,154
4,871,424
1,139,885
14,518,344
2,493,293
270,639
10,594,177
7,357,037
335,714
325,758
2,030,584
60,600
4,302,549
108,074
831,551
2,153,759
7,523,125
25,678
302,646
350,706
5,086,756
115,423
191,160

Percent of Total
Gross Output
100
4.23
0.25
7.16
1.68
21.34
3.66
0.39
15.57
10.81
0.49
0.48
2.98
0.08
6.32
0.15
1.22
3.16
11.05
0.03
0.44
0.51
7.48
0.17
0.28

Percent of Total
Enterprises
100
4.5
3.6
8.1
2.7
9.9
4.5
0
13.51
2.7
0
0
0
0
11.71
0
0
3.6
10.81
0
2.7
0
8.1
0
0

Another foreign owned dairy farm, Hua Xia, has completely ignored the most
popular method of dairy production in China, milk stations, and owns its own farms.
Furthermore it uses California dairy farm style, open air stalls with technologically
advance milking houses, in order to ensure the health of the cows and the safety of the
milk. It operates by the motto that happy cows make better milk and aims to provide the
best environment for cows and farmers alike. Like Nestle, Hua Xia places large
importance on education of its personnel and farms and has training courses for farming
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personnel.112 These methods, along with high technological standards have allowed both
Nestle and Hua Xia to operate without food safety issues that are felt by other Chinese
dairy companies.
The dragon-head structure that dominates dairy production is not the best method
of ensuring food safety in the dairy industry. The structure is fragmented and leaves room
for errors to be made and go unnoticed. For dairy, a hybrid system using the above three
described structures is the best choice for ensuring dairy safety. Processing companies
need to improve supervision over all steps in the production process to prevent issues
such as melamine contamination. A hybrid system would be best both for food safety and
for the rural farmers that still dominate the agricultural structure in China.

PORK
Production of pork is organized in a similar manner to dairy production. Large
processing companies dominate the industry and the independent small processing is
shrinking. Compared to dairy production, meat production in China is much more
industrialized and even better suited to large scale processing. Large processing industries
include Shuanghui Group in Henan Province, Yurun Group in Jiangsu Province, Jinluo
Group and Delisi Group in Shandong Province, Kunpeng Group in Beijing, Huazheng
Group in Jilin Province, and Tieqi Group and Lishi Group in Sichuan Province.113 Most
of these industrial groups use a similar system of vertical commercial integration, but the
three main commercial integration structures described above dominate the industry:
112
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dragon-head farms, processing centers and cooperatives, and company owned farms.
However, like the dairy industry more processing centers are reacting to food safety
issues and are trying to improve their system of vertical integration.
The first and most popular commercial structure is the dragon-head model where
thousands of small farmers are integrated into large-scale business. Companies provide
seed, feed, medicine, technology, and marketing while farmers provide the raw
product.114 Farmers and companies are “linked in order to conduct a version of
industrialized large-scale production.”115 Farmers that are commercially connected to
processing companies under this model are often treated poorly and are given unfair
prices for their goods, but can also renege on their contracts and sell their goods to
another processing center.116 Furthermore, the most recent pork scandal, the clenbuterol
scandal, arose from a company that uses this system.
A subsidiary of Shuanghui Group was found to have been the source of this
contaminated pork. Shuanghui Group is the largest meat-processing center in the entire
country slaughtering 15 million heads and producing over 100 million tons of pork
annually.117 With production centers in over 12 provinces, Shuanghui is both
transnational and transregional and also exports internationally.118 During the clenbuterol
scandal in April 2011, it was discovered that the contaminated pork came from
clenbuterol tainted feed. In most cases feed is provided by the company so this implicates

114

Ibid., 18.
Ibid.
116
Ibid.
117
(2011). Group Profile: About us. Shuanghui Group. Retrieved from
http://en.shuanghui.com.cn.
118
(2011). Group Profile: About us. Shuanghui Group. Retrieved from
http://en.shuanghui.com.cn.
115

51

the company. In this instance the farmer is supposed to trust the company and therefore
the food safety issues cannot be blamed on the farmer, but on the company. However it
was only found in one of Shuanghui’s subsidiary companies not in the main company
itself and the source of the clenbuterol is not well known. The use of clenbuterol however
is known to be common and widespread.
The second form of commercial vertical integration is the cooperative association
plus the large scale enterprises system. This model was first implemented in Qingzhu
village in an attempt to increase the living standards of the Chinese pork farmers.119 This
is also a system of large scale production, but with this system, as described above, the
farmers have more benefits. In its trial run at Qingzhu village the system enhanced the
quality of the hogs, improved efficiency of the industry, and increased income of the
farmers.120 Because of the results, this system is viewed as an improvement on the
dragon-head system of production. A large scale processing business still operates the
processing side of the system, but because the farmers form an association together, they
are able to have more benefits and pool their resources, which leads to a higher quality of
pork. Delisi Company aims to achieve this model in order to optimize production and
food quality. Another form of cooperative farming is not as popular, but incorporates the
entire processing system. This system sets up a bridge between small-scale farmers and
large scale markets. For many farmers the industry has become too large for them to
handle individually, so they work together to form this commercial system. The largest
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farmers’ cooperative is in Taiyan city, Shanxi Province. It incorporates more than 32
hundred-scale farms.
The final mode of production is company owned farms. The companies create
base farms, which they own and then have local rural farmers farm the land. These are
large-scale farms, owned by companies that also control the processing system. Yurun
Group uses this mode of production, but like the dairy industry, still utilizes small hog
farmers.121 Zhongpin Inc on the other hand owns its own farm and controls the entire
process from farm to store. Based in Henan Province, Zhongpin has processing and
distribution centers all throughout the country (see Figure 4).
Figure 4: Zhongpin Distribution Map122

Unlike dairy processing companies, which are specialized in only dairy, all of
these companies are agricultural processing companies that process meats, fruits and
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vegetables. Although most of the meat they process is pork, they also process other
meats. For some companies this facilitates the creation of markets that sell goods
processed by these companies. Zhongpin Inc for example has a total of 2,995 retail stores
where it sells not only its pork products but all other meat products and fruits and
vegetables as well.123 Zhongpin is viewed as a more modern production system since it
owns its own farms, processing center and retail stores. This system has allowed
Zhongpin to pass many inspections and receive high product quality and safety ratings.
Shuanghui’s Shineway label is also a chain retail supermarket where Shuanghui Group
sells its agricultural goods.
The main method of improving food safety in the pork industry is modernization
of processing centers and technological advances for testing the pork and for tracking the
pork. IBM is currently working with Shandong Commercial Group Co. to create a system
that will track their products. This system is intended to ensure the safety of their
products as they reach coastal regions of the country. Called “food supply managementtechnology” this system will go from farm, to slaughterhouses to supermarket shelves
and will give the company the ability to trace where all of the food originated.124 This
will be important for accountability and for discovering where food safety issues stem
from. The company also wants to increase consumer confidence as consumers have been
bombarded with food safety issues over the past year.
Unlike the dairy industry, there is no clear structure that appears to be better for
improving food safety. The dragon-head structure has experienced the most food safety
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issues, like in the dairy industry, but it also completely dominates the pork processing
sector. Some companies do own their own farms, but technological advances, such as
IBM’s food safety system, seem to be the best method of improving accountability,
product quality and overall food safety in the industry.

CONCLUSION
Vertical integration of commerce in the dairy and pork industries needs to be
improved in order to improve food safety in China. Dairy’s production chain is in the
midst of reforming, but still has many holes where problems can arise. The pork industry
on the other hand is fairly well established and is relying on larger, but still distanced
farms and could benefit greatly from technological advances. It is in the interests of these
processing companies to have the safest goods possible, because it increases consumer
confidence, but the government and regulatory agencies are responsible for ensuring that
these companies follow guidelines. If commercial structure of pork, dairy, and other
agricultural products can be streamlined in order to form closer connections between
every production stage, the structure will then be easier to regulate and food safety issues
will more easily be avoided. Regulation and implementation of food safety laws and
regulations on these commercial systems now needs to be examined in order to improve
overall food safety in China.
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CHAPTER 3: GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS
INTRODUCTION
The final obstacle on the path to improving food safety in China is regulation and
implementation of food safety laws. Proper regulation and implementation of food safety
is a large problem in China because all other elements of food safety rely on good and
comprehensive regulation and implementation of those regulations. For example, it does
not matter if an industry has a strong and easy to regulate agricultural structure if the
regulatory agencies are not good at regulating. Similarly, commercial structure is
unimportant if regulation and implementation of the industry are subpar. China’s current
system of regulation is too fragmented, which allows food safety problems to slip through
the cracks unnoticed. Additionally, implementation at the local level needs to improve in
order to ensure that the regulations are actually being followed. There are five main
factors of this problem to discuss: regulatory laws, regulatory agencies, education by
those agencies, regulatory standards, and local implementation of laws and standards.
These five elements are extremely important when examining food safety because they
are the source of most issues in regulation and implementation. Although each factor is
extremely complex, these weaknesses could be improved by streamlining the regulatory
system and changing the regulatory focus from reaction to food safety issues to
prevention of food safety issues.
Streamlining regulation would fix China’s fragmentation issue. Regulation could
be streamlined by giving regulatory power to one or two agencies instead of the thirteen
that are currently involved in food safety, or by creating an entirely new agency that is
completely responsible for food safety. This would, however, be very difficult, because
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high levels of bureaucracy and political gridlock would impede the process. Additionally,
the regulatory agencies can improve local implementing by changing the focus from
reaction to prevention in order to stop food safety problems before they happen. The laws
only focus on punishments for violators, not on how to prevent violations from occurring.
By examining the laws governing regulation, ministries in charge of regulation, the role
of education in each industry, implementation of those regulations, and reports on local
implementation, problems in the regulatory structure and implementation will be revealed
and solutions will be examined.

LAWS REGULATING FOOD SAFETY IN CHINA
There are three main laws regulating food safety in China: the Product Quality
Law of 1993, the Food Hygiene Law of 1995, and the Food and Safety Law of 2009. The
Product Quality Law of 1993 applies to the General Administration of Quality
Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ), giving it the power to issue permits to
food processors and other food enterprises. The Food Hygiene Law of 1995 was the first
law intended to focus directly on food safety, but the focus of this law was more on the
cleanliness of food than the safety of the food.125 According to the law, the safety of food
is dependent on the cleanliness of the food preparation and processing centers not on
what is inside the food or what bacteria may have contaminated the food. There is some
mention of additives, but the chapter entitled “Safety of Food” is only about hygiene and
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cleanliness of food preparation.126 This law originally gave regulatory power to multiple
agencies, fragmenting the process.
The most recent law, the Food and Safety Law of 2009, was an attempt to
streamline and enforce food safety regulation. It was passed in reaction to the melamine
scandal of 2008 with hopes that it would prevent another similar scandal, but it did very
little to improve the fragmentation of the regulatory system. This law changed the
methods of regulation, the duties of each ministry, and created the State Council Food
Safety Commission in order to improve the regulation of food safety in China.127
However, currently the room for ambiguity within the law prevents effective regulation
and many scholars think that China missed its chance for an effective regulatory system
by passing the Food and Safety Law without clearly defined regulatory provisions.128 The
State Council Food Safety Commission, which that focuses on food additives, edible
farm products, and food processing, theoretically would improve regulation and food
safety, but the power of this commission is again hindered by the fragmentation of the
system. Under this law, regulatory power is still spread between many ministries and
none of the ministries want to relinquish control over their areas of focus or the added
revenue of regulation, maintaining the system of fragmentation that exists today.129
Although these measures did not do much to improve the fragmentation of the
food safety system, the law did improve food safety regulations with several substantive
measures. The law directly outlines food safety standards, including what can and needs
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to be regulated, inspection and testing of food, licensing of processing and distribution of
food, and created harsher penalties for violations of the law. 130 There is a much larger
focus on the quality and safety of the food including additives, pesticides, and other
harmful contaminates that make food unsafe for consumption. The law requires stricter
regulations on food safety and has a true focus on food safety compared to the Food
Hygiene Law of 1995.131 In Article 6 of the Food Hygiene Law of 1995 it says, “Food
shall be non-toxic, harmless, and meet the inherent nutrition requirements and present the
corresponding organoleptic properties, such as color, smell, taste, etc.”132 In the same
section of the Food Safety Law of 2009 it says, “The food safety standards shall specify:
The limits to the content or concentration of pathogenic microorganisms, pesticide
residues, veterinary medicine residue, heavy metals, contaminants, and other substances
that may be hazardous to human health in food.”133 The regulations placed by the Food
Safety Law are much more specific and focused on food safety issues. All of these
regulations are an improvement over the lax regulations and inspection guidelines in the
past, and have the power to improve food safety.

MINISTRIES IN CHARGE OF REGULATION
Although the new food safety law improves regulations over food itself, the
regulatory system is still highly fragmented and too many agencies have overlapping
jurisdiction (see Table 7). Thirteen different ministries and agencies are responsible for
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some element of food safety regulation. In contrast, in the United States only two
agencies are responsible for food safety, the FDA and USDA. China’s fragmented
system, composed of so many different agencies and ministries, allows for more
mistakes, weaker regulations, and unclear and overlapping jurisdictions. For example,
when the power to declare certain foods fit to eat is given to multiple ministries, the
consumer can be faced with an extremely confusing situation and retailers will not know
which foods are safe to sell. When cancer-causing chemicals were found to be in
vermicelli in 2005, the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and
Quarantine (GAQSIQ) declared 30 brands of vermicelli fit for consumption, but the
Ministry of Health (MoH) only listed 7 brands fit for consumption.134 The consumer was
given the task of deciding which ministry was more trustworthy, and stores were not
forced to remove certain brands since they were on one of the ministries’ lists.
Figure 5: Regulatory control over production chain

Ministry of Health: National Standard

AQSIQ:
Production and
Processing

SAIC:
Distribution of
Food

SFDA: Production
and Processing

AQSIQ: General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine, SAIC: State
Administration for Industry and Commerce, SFDA: State Food and Drug Association

Furthermore, a different regulatory agency has control over each part of the
production chain. For example, the Ministry of Health will set the national standard for
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milk, but the AQSIQ will set the regulations for the production and processing of milk.
Once the product leaves the processing center, then the SAIC regulates the distribution of
food. Finally, consumption in restaurants and cafeterias is controlled by the State Food
and Drug Administration. Since each stage of the production chain is controlled by
different agencies each stage has different regulations. Regulations could be stricter in
one stage than the other leading to confusing regulations for companies to follow.
Table 7: Ministires in Charge of Regulation and their Responsibilities135

Institution

Ministry of
Health (MoH)

Law
China's Food
Hygiene Law
1995

Food Safety
Law 2009
Ministry of
Agriculture
(MoA)
Ministry of
Commerce
(MoC)
General
Administration
of Quality
Supervision,
Inspection and
Quarantine
(AQSIQ)

Food Safety
Law 2009
Food Safety
Law 2009

The Product
Quality Law
1993

Food Safety
Law 2009

Responsibilities
In charge of Supervision and management of food
hygiene. Authorities: issuing hygiene licenses;
monitoring, inspecting and providing technical
guidance for food hygiene; investigating and dealing
with food poisoning or food contamination incidents,
and imposing fines or revoking hygiene license.
Assess food safety risk, set national standards of
food safety, release information relating to food
safety, regulate food safety testing, investigate food
safety incidents. (SFDA works under MoH)

Where in
processing
chain

Set national
standard

Responsible for non-processed farm products
Can enact and amend standards and rules regarding
the procedures for food processing, packaging,
storage, transportation, and sales
Issues production permits for food processors and
producers, supervises licensed food enterprises for
compliance with regulations concerning food
manufacturing, packaging, and labeling, and is
empowered to crack down on unlicensed food
processing and production. Can issue fines,
confiscate products, and ban food manufacturers
from continuing production.
Supervision of food production and food
export/import

Production and
processing
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State
Administration
for Industry
and Commerce
(SAIC)
State Food and
Drug
Administration
(SFDA)
State Council
Food Safety
Commission

The Product
Quality Law
1993
Food Safety
Law 2009

Food Safety
Law 2009

Issues business license and oversees food hygiene in
urban and rural markets, empowered to fine and
revoke business license of violators
Supervise the domestic wholesale and retail food
sectors
Authorized to exercise comprehensive supervision
over safety of food, health products and cosmetics.
Coordinates relevant bureaucracies, to draft laws,
and administrative regulations concerning food
safety. (Has very little actual power)

Food Safety
Law 2009

Co-ordinate and oversee new food supervision
apparatus

Food
distribution

Consumption
(Restaurant,
Cafeteria, etc.)

According 2009’s Food Safety Law, the MoH is the main agency in charge of
food safety and all the other agencies report to the MoH. However, many industries can
form their own regulations over different parts of the production chain. The MoH sets the
national standard, but then all other portions of regulation are divided among other
agencies. The law also created a separate council for food safety, but the duties of this
council are not clearly defined in the Food Safety Law or in the law’s implementation
measures. Solving fragmentation is extremely difficult because many of the agencies are
competitive and refuse to work together. This competitiveness is caused by a large
amount of political gridlock as different agencies do not want to lose jurisdiction and
therefore revenue over areas of food safety. This causes agencies to do not share
information, nor take the blame when there are large food safety issues. Blame is passed
around without officially blaming any one agency or individual, and eventually falls on a
scapegoat who did not play a large role in the issue.136
Furthermore, all of these ministries want to maintain the current balance because
regulation of food safety increases their revenue and power. For example, when the
AQSIQ issues permits it receives an increase in revenue; production and processing
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centers pay for each permit they receive. If regulatory power was consolidated, the
AQSIQ could lose this area of control and lose revenue. This is the same situation for all
ministries that have a role in food safety regulation. Additionally, because all of the
ministries do not want to lose areas of control, there is internal political struggle that
prevents changes to the current regulatory structure. All of the ministries want to
maintain their political power, which prevents anything from getting done. This law
attempted to fix previous problems, but, as seen in Table 7, the problems remain. Food
safety problems will continue to occur until the problem is resolved.

EDUCATION
Another area where the regulatory system needs to improve is in education of
farmers, processors, and retailers. Many food safety issues occur because of ignorance of
farmers. As a result of a growth and change in production, production methods have
changed drastically. The methods that farmers use are not always safe, but most are
uneducated and do not know what safe farming practices are. For example, when farmers
are given feed that is supposed to make their livestock grow faster and leaner, they do not
question why. Additionally, there has been an increase in the use of drugs to keep
animals alive, or stimulate and enhance their growth. Antibiotics are used to combat or
prevent diseases, and stimulants such as clenbuterol are used to add meat to the body of a
pig, enhancing the leanness of the meat, without thought being given to how these drugs
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will affect the humans who consume the meat.137 Farmers do these things in order to be
competitive with other farmers; they do not know the repercussions.
Farmers need to be better educated in order to ensure the safety of their food.
According to the Food Safety Law, “civil society and community groups are encouraged
to conduct food safety educational activities on understanding food safety, laws,
regulations, and standards, to advocate healthy diets and to raise consumer awareness of
food safety and looking after their health.”138 This however does not require that anyone
educates the public about food safety and does not mandate a specific agency to be
responsible for food safety.
In 2011 the government began a year-long campaign to promote food safety and
raise awareness of food safety. It has become a top priority for the Chinese government
and the media is now widely reporting these issues.139 This is supported by the Food
Safety Law, which states that “food safety information, laws, regulations and standards
shall be publicized by the media.”140 The Chinese government and media are taking on
the role of educating the public, but one of the ministries should also be involved. In the
United States, for example, the USDA is responsible for educating the public about issues
ranging from what items have been recalled to how to properly handle and prepare raw
meat.141 There is an entire section of the website devoted to teaching the consumer. China
should follow this example and try to prevent food safety issues not only react to them.
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STANDARDS
The final issue in regulation of food safety is the lax regulations or near lack of
regulation that was common in the early 2000s. In the melamine scandal of 2008,
melamine went undetected for almost an entire year because large dairy companies were
not regularly tested; large well-known companies were given exemption from testing.142
Melamine was deliberately added to the milk and the company knew of the
contamination, but because large companies were exempt from regular testing, this
information did not become public until after the deaths of many children. According to
Article 18 of the Food Hygiene Law, enterprises were allowed to regulate themselves:
“Enterprises engaged in food production, management and sale shall perfect their own
food safety control system, assign full-time or part-time food safety control personnel,
and strengthen laboratory testing work related to the foods they produce and sell.”143
There were given inspection free status.144 People were severely punished for their part in
the scandal, but the damage was done. Lax regulations, or near lack of regulations,
combined with a fragmented regulatory system, allowed this scandal to happen.
Although there have been reforms to regulations, the dairy industry still faces
much controversy over specific standards. For example, bacterium content regulations are
controversial because the limit for China’s dairy is much less stringent than the
international limit. The limit in China is 2 million units per milliliter, while
internationally it is 100,000 units per milliliter. It is an improvement on past standards of
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4 million units per milliliter.145 Additionally the AQSIQ lowered minimum protein level
in dairy from 2.95% to 2.8% in order to decrease the incentives of adding melamine to
milk, but officials have faced some complaints from that change.146 The AQSIQ also
imposes regulations that many companies do not have the funds to achieve. In early 2011,
AQSIQ instituted new regulations for dairy requiring processing companies to test for 64
additives, including melamine. The equipment needed for these tests will cost companies
at least 3 million yuan (US $456,000).147 By some estimates, only companies with annual
revenues exceeding 80 million yuan will be able to afford this upgrade.148 Because of the
financial restrictions of many companies, many firms fail inspections. In early April
2011, AQSIQ reported that 643 firms passed inspection, while 426 failed and 107 were in
suspension.149
Standards set by the regulatory agencies are becoming stricter; however, many
still complain that these standards are not enough. Calls for more stringent regulations,
especially in the dairy industry, are frequent. Furthermore, many food safety issues occur
because not all companies can afford to test their products to see if they meet the
regulations. Companies need to implement their own inspection measures in order to
prevent future food safety issues, but currently the local branches of regulatory agencies
are not good at implementing laws and ensuring that companies follow the standards put
in place by the central regulatory agencies.
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IMPLEMENTATION
Implementation at the local level is the largest problem facing regulations,
because the laws and standards that the central regulatory agencies pass are useless unless
there is effective implementation of the regulations. According to an official, local
“officials generally exhibit a lackluster response to food safety matters… they will only
take it seriously if it’s linked to their positions or performance.”150 Frequently, local
governments and regulatory offices do not follow the regulations because it is profitable
for them to ignore food safety problems. Revenue generation is often more important
than food safety regulations, which can limit local growth.151 Local food safety offices
have been set up around the country in recent years, but they dodge responsibility and
blame other departments where there are food safety issues.152 However, licenses are
enthusiastically issued by these departments because they bring in money.153 The local
offices are useless unless there is some guarantee that the officers will benefit from good
performance. Currently the local offices are ineffective because they are more focused on
their careers than on their performance. Local officials also often overlook violations
when personal bribes are offered, and, in order to create more revenue for the region,
local regulatory agencies will frequently fine businesses instead of halting their practices
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when a violation is discovered.154 According to a dairy farmer from Shijiazhuang, “In this
business, bribery keeps everyone silent.”155
The government does not stress the importance of implementation and focuses
instead on reacting to food safety issues. Therefore, harsh punishments such as the death
penalty are being used in an attempt to prevent violations of food safety regulations. The
regulatory agencies seem to think that the best method of improving implementation is to
increase the levels of punishment, but preventative methods would avoid the problem
altogether. China’s regulatory agencies need to focus on ways to prevent food safety
scandals, not only how to respond to food safety scandals, in order to improve food
safety.
Implementation in the dairy industry is a very serious problem, as the industry has
been fraught with food safety scandals in the past. In 2008, in reaction to the melamine
scandal, a total of 21 people were charged with crimes. 156 Two men were executed for
their part in the scandal. Zhang Yujun, a cattle farmer, was executed for endangering
public safety, and Geng Jinpin, a salesman, was executed for producing and selling toxic
food.157 Many people think that these two men were scapegoats and that most of the
blame should have fallen on Tian Wenhua, Sanlu’s general manager, who received a life
sentence. 158 Other Sanlu executives were sentenced to between 5 and 15 years in jail.159
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Four officials in the city were fired: the vice mayor in charge of agricultural production,
the Shijiazhuang Municipal Animal Husbandry and Fishery Bureau director,
Shijiazhuang Municipal Food and Drug Administration director, Shijiazhuang Municipal
Bureau of Quality and Technical Supervision director. The mayor of Shijiazhaung also
resigned.160 Chief of AQSIQ, Li Changjiang was the most senior official to resign and the
Communist Party chief in Shijiazhuang was fired.161
Although many people were punished as a result of this scandal, others feel that
the wrong people were punished. Zhang Yujun and Geng Jinpin were merely a cattle
farmer and a salesman, respectively. Their actions were illegal and they deserved to be
punished, but the actions of Sanlu’s general manager, Tian Wenhua, were much worse.
Tian knew milk was tainted in May, but did not inform officials in Shijiazhuang city until
August. There are some reports that the company knew as early as December of 2007,
but waited to cover it up until there were more complaints. After Sanlu told the city
officials, the city officials waited a month, from August 2 to September 9, before telling
the provincial officials because of the Olympics.162 It is reported that the officials were
pushed to prevent this issue from becoming common knowledge until after the Olympics,
which were important for international status and national harmony.
A year after the melamine scandal, melamine was found again in dairy products
because tainted milk powder from 2008 had not been destroyed. This second scandal
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occurred because regulations were not enforced; companies were told to destroy the milk
powder, but many did not.163 The companies did not understand how to destroy the milk
powder, but the government did not help them or enforce the rule. Instead, stockpiles of
contaminated milk powder remained and were added to raw milk to increase the apparent
protein content. Milk companies were supposed to be testing for melamine, but two years
later it was still found in products because processing centers are not properly inspected
and implementation of regulations is poor.
Later, in 2011, there was another milk safety scandal. Mengniu, one of the largest
and most trusted dairy processing companies, was found to have dairy products
contaminated with a liver-damaging carcinogen. Companies are required to test for this
carcinogen, but because the testing equipment costs 4,000 to 6,000 yuan, many do not
test for it. Companies need to improve inspection of their own products.164 Again, the
focus for this scandal was on punishing those who violated the laws after the fact. 14
people were sentenced for producing or selling tainted milk. Two people received life
sentences, four received 10 to 15 years, and the others all received lighter sentences. In
addition to jail time, fines ranged from 200,000 yuan to 400,000 yuan. 165
In the pork industry, the reaction to food safety violations has been the same and
there are few reports on preventative actions taken by local or central regulatory agencies.
For the Shuanghui clenbuterol scandal in April 2011, “at least six officials and
employees at lower-level animal inspection stations have been fired or suspended, while
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22 others—pig farm managers, traders and slaughterhouse staff—have been detained.”166
Five people were convicted of “endangering public security by using dangerous means,”
for their role in feeding clenbuterol to pigs. Sentences ranged from 9 years to life with
one person receiving the death penalty. These sentences were so extreme because all the
defendants were aware of the contamination, but did nothing about it. By the end of the
scandal, in total, 113 people in total were penalized for their role in the scandal, including
17 government officials. 167 The 17 government officials involved, which included animal
health and food safety inspectors, got 3 to 9 years imprisonment.168 One man received the
death penalty for illegal clandestine production of clenbuerol.
Again, this reaction focused on the punishment of those involved, not ways to
prevent people from committing this same offense in the future. Currently the Chinese
government is focusing too much on reacting to food safety violations and not enough on
how to prevent food safety scandals. Punishments for violations are clearly outlined in
the new Food Safety Law that range from small fines to the death penalty. The
government needs to work towards improving local implementation of these laws by
working to decrease corruption and changing methods of evaluation to promote
implementation of all food safety regulations. They also need to put a larger burden on
the companies to self-regulate and change the way they review the work of the local
officials. Reviews of local officials given the task of regulating food safety should be
based on the number of farms, manufacturers, and processors that pass food safety
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inspections. For example, fining individuals or companies should not be rewarded unless
the fine resulted in an actual change in the actions of that individual or company.
Evaluations should also look to discourage bribery and corruption, a problem throughout
the entire Chinese government.

UNITED STATES REGULATION STRUCTURE
One model that China could look to in improving its regulatory system is the
United States. This model would be suitable because the United States is similar in size to
China and is also an agricultural giant. Furthermore , although the United States relies on
large-scale farms, it has many more small-scale farms that it also needs to regulate. China
could follow their model of regulation on its small and large-scale farms in order to
improve the regulatory system. In the United States, all food safety regulations are
controlled by two agencies, the FDA and the USDA. The FDA controls almost all
agricultural products except meat and poultry products. This is due to an historical
division of power, not different concerns for safety. The FDA originates from a branch of
the USDA that was given control over all agricultural goods except for meat and poultry.
This job eventually became too big to be under the USDA and now the FDA is its own
Administration under the Department of Health and Human Services. Therefore food
safety jurisdiction is divided. Having only two agencies responsible for regulation with
clear division of jurisdiction allows for laws and regulations to be uniform and easier to
follow since there are not many regulatory agencies acting on the same item in different
ways. 169

169

(2011, Sep. 6). Food Safety is Still a Critical Issue in China. China Daily.
72

The FDA has a special food safety office, The Center for Food Safety and
Applied Nutrition, which issues regulations, recalls food products, and conducts
inspections. The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938 established the legal
framework within which FDA operates. The most recent food safety law was passed in
January 2011, the Food Safety Modernization Act which is much more proactive and
focuses on preventative control, not on reaction to food safety products. This law gives
the FDA more power to recall food products, calls for more frequent inspections, and
places more responsibility on farmers and food processors to prevent contamination.
Additionally, the FDA sets national standards and works with state inspectors and
bureaus in order to ensure the safety of food products in the United States.
The USDA also has its own food safety branch, the Food Safety and Inspection
Service.170 The FSIS is “responsible for ensuring that the nation's commercial supply of
meat, poultry, and egg products is safe, wholesome, and correctly labeled and
packaged.”171 The FSIS educates consumers on food safety handling, even using a mobile
application to teach consumers about proper preparation and handling of food. There are
many laws regulating each specific industry, which the USDA regulates, clearly outlining
regulations of food and the USDA’s power.172 Like the FDA, the USDA is preventionoriented and performs frequent inspections in coordination with private and state
inspection services to see if farms and processing companies are following regulations.
Although the United States’ regulatory system it is not perfect, it is much more
streamlined than China’s system, with only two agencies involved in regulation and
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safety control. China has adopted much of the technology used in the United States to
monitor food safety, but it must take a step further and improve its regulatory and
implementation systems as well. The USDA and FDA work hard to coordinate with local
government branches and independent inspectors to inspect facilities and ensure food
safety. If China were to look to the American model of food safety regulation for
inspiration and guidance, it could avoid the current confusing regulations and create a
cohesive system that has complete control over food safety, ensuring that the food on
people’s tables is safe to eat.

CONCLUSION
The fragmentation of the regulatory system in China is responsible for most food
safety problems in China. If there were proper regulations, education, and a streamlined
regulatory structure, then there would be many fewer food safety issues. China bases its
agricultural goals on the structure of the United States, but it would do better to base its
regulatory structure on the structure of the United States as well. Creating one agency
that is responsible for food safety or giving the power to one or two existing agencies
would make regulations more effective and would improve overall food safety in China.
This is true across all industries and would optimize food safety. However, regulation
alone is not enough if there is not proper implementation of food safety regulations and
laws. Methods of implementation need to improve and regulatory agencies need to put a
greater stress on preventing food safety issues instead of merely reacting to them. By
streamlining the regulatory system and improving implementation of food safety, China
will be able to avoid many food safety issues in the future.
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CONCULSION
Raising the standard of food safety in China is a complex and important issue.
Without effective food safety regulation, China has experienced terrible tragedies that
have resulted not only in illness, but also in death. The melamine scandal of 2008 was the
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worst food safety issue that China has recently faced with six infant deaths and 300,000
ill infants. This event caused incredible backlash in China and people are still worried
and complaining today about the quality of milk. More recent food safety scandals have
not resulted in death, but illnesses have broken out throughout China as a result of food
safety issues and the Chinese people do not trust that their food is safe. All of these issues
make the improvement of food safety regulation very important for future Chinese health,
society, and economy.
As described in the introduction, four main issues are proposed by scholars as
possible causes of the current food safety issues in China; dispersed agricultural structure,
broken commercial structure, fragmented regulatory system, and poor implementation.
Of these four main issues, three issues strongly affect regulation: broken commercial
structure, fragmented regulatory system, and poor implementation. These three issues are
currently the largest obstacles facing food safety regulation in China because they impede
the regulatory process. Commercial structure impedes the process because it leaves room
for errors, the fragmented regulatory structure prevents effective regulation, and poor
implementation allows errors to slip through the cracks unnoticed. In order to improve
food safety and strengthen trust in the food industry China needs to streamline the
commercial system, create a new regulatory agency or give regulatory power to only two
or three ministries, and change how local officials implement policy.

Although restructuring agriculture in order to improve food safety is a highly
popular idea among scholars in China, the highly dispersed structure that characterizes
Chinese agriculture is not responsible for food safety issues in China. It does make
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regulation of each individual farm difficult, but because all farms are commercially
vertically integrated with larger processing companies, the small farms, when joined with
the large farms, form a larger scale production structure. This is supported by reports of
agriculture in both the dairy and pork industries. Most dairy farms in China are very
small, but each farm is connected commercially to a larger processing company.
Furthermore, dairy production is concentrated in northern China, not widely dispersed
across the country like some scholars claim. Production of pork on the hand is
widespread and also still based on smaller scale farms. However, like dairy, pork
production is connected commercially to larger processing centers creating a larger scale
production structure.
Although the dairy and pork industries have different geographic and agricultural
structures, the commercial and economic structures are very similar and follow this
commercially integrated structure. Both of these industries rely on the small farms that
scholars criticize, but these farms rely on the large scale businesses. In the dairy industry,
small farmers rely on milking stations built and owned by companies such as Mengniu
and Yili. That milk is later sent to these companies for processing. In the pork industry
feed, medicine and technology are provided by the company that will eventually buy,
slaughter, and process the pig. This structure acts very similar to the proposed
transformation of the agricultural system. Restructuring agricultural structure to follow
the large scale American-style farm is unnecessary and would cause too much strife in
the Chinese countryside. Also, because the farms are commercial integrated, it appears
that the structure of farming is not at fault and commercial interests need to be more
closely examined.
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Given this information, vertical integration of commerce in the dairy and pork
industries needs to be improved in order to improve food safety in China. Currently the
production chain is very fragmented with too many steps and too much room for errors.
In most industries the path from farm to processing center involves too many middlemen
creating multiple areas for problems and mistakes. This is related to the widespread
agricultural structure that characterizes China’s agriculture. Because of this structure,
large companies have to rely on small farms for their raw goods. This system creates a
commercial structure with many stages creating more work for regulatory agencies and
leaving a lot of room for mistakes and mishaps. Dairy’s production chain is in the midst
of reforming, but still has many holes where problems can arise. The pork industry on the
other hand is fairly well established and is relying on larger, but still distanced farms, and
could benefit greatly from technological advances. Both the melamine scandal of 2008
and the more recent clenbuterol scandal of 2011 occurred because of gaps in commercial
regulation, testing and commercial structure; melamine would not have been added to the
milk if the middleman collecting the milk had a stronger connection to the processing
company.
Therefore, the commercial structure of pork, dairy and other agricultural products
should be streamlined in order to form closer connections between every production
stage. The structure will then be easier to regulate and food safety issues will more easily
be avoided. Technological solutions have been offered both by the Chinese government
and by companies such as IBM to help both the consumer and processor track where their
meat and produce are coming from. The IBM project would help the Shandong Group
track their pork products far down the production chain all the way to the farm where the
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pig originated. This will not only increase consumer trust, but also make targeting the
source of food safety issues much easier and therefore easier to deal with and fix. The
goal is that increased accountability and control will lead to safer food products. It is in
the interests of these processing companies to have the safest goods possible in order to
increase profits and consumer confidence, but part of the burden of safety also lies on
governmental regulatory agencies that are responsible for ensuring that these companies
follow guidelines.
Problems in the regulatory system in China are extremely important because all
other elements of food safety rely on proper regulation and implementation. The
fragmentation of the system is responsible for most food safety problems in China.
Currently there are 13 ministries in charge of food safety in China, that each control
different portions of the food production and processing chain. This fragmentation allows
for the same product to have different safety regulations at different stages; even entire
items could be deemed safe by one ministry and not by another and therefore the
safe/unsafe item would still be consumed. This system also leads to poor implementation
of the regulations and laws because the system is very unclear. New laws have been
passed that attempt to streamline regulations and improve implementation, but the
problems still remain.
This fragmentation is hard to fix because of political gridlock in Chinese
bureaucracy. None of the regulatory agencies want to give up control of their section of
food safety because regulation of food safety means an increase in revenue and an
increase in political power. If a new agency was created, many existing agencies would
lose that power and revenue; therefore it is very hard to streamline regulation. The
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multiple agencies combined with political gridlock also leads to poor communication
between ministries and therefore more food safety issues can slip through the cracks
unnoticed. The ideal solution to this problem would be to create a new agency or give
regulatory power only to two or three existing agencies, but given the political gridlock, a
more practical solution would be to slowly streamline regulation and attempt to increase
communication between agencies.
The most feasible method of improving food safety regulation is to improve
implementation of food safety regulations and laws. Currently implementation of food
safety regulations is focused on punishments of violators. After the melamine scandal
two men were put to death and one woman received life in prison, and punishments have
continued to get harsher. There was an investigation on how melamine entered the system
and melamine was outlawed as an additive, but methods of future implementation of
these laws were not investigated. Many scholars claim that the punishments signal an
improvement in implementation, but it really just marks a poor regulatory system because
problems are not being caught before the products reach the shelves. Today, local food
safety offices do not benefit from closing down factories if they violate food safety
regulations so many food safety issues go ignored. Revenue only increases from issuance
of licenses to produce; officials are not rewarded for proper implementation. Therefore
officials do not properly regulate and most food safety regulations are ignored.
In order to improve regulation and implementation China needs to change how it
evaluates regulatory officials to put a greater stress on preventing food safety scandals
instead of reacting to them. Evaluation of Chinese officials needs to focus on proper
implementation of laws and officials should be rewarded for good work, not just for
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increasing revenue. Evaluations should also look to discourage bribery and corruption,
although it is a problem throughout the Chinese government. The government also needs
to encourage processing companies to increase self-inspections and enforce laws that
require companies to test their own products. This will prevent food that is contaminated
or toxic from leaving the processing center and it will never be consumed. Greater focus
on prevention instead of on reaction will greatly improve food safety throughout all
industries in China.
In order to improve food safety and prevent scandals that have plagued China in
the past, China needs to work to streamline its commercial structure of agriculture,
streamline its regulatory structure and improve implementation of food safety regulations
and laws. Although scholars place importance on the structure of agriculture as well, for
the dairy and pork industries the structure of agriculture cannot be adapted to benefit food
safety. Agricultural reform would do more harm than good. In the commercial sector,
companies need to work to better integrate production with processing in order to prevent
gaps in the production chain. Creating a more cohesive system would allow for more
control and accountability decreasing the risk of food safety issues. Regulatory agencies
on the other hand need to improve and streamline regulatory structure and place greater
emphasis on prevention of issues instead of reaction to food safety scandals. Finally
implementation of regulations by local officials needs to be improved by changing
methods of evaluating officials in order to encourage proper inspection and
implementation.
Food safety is a critical and complex issue in China that needs to be closely
examined. Most food safety issues occur because of governmental faults and mistakes
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made by enterprises. For most industries improving food quality is imperative because
lack of consumer confidence will result in decreased revenue. Therefore, although the
government has many problems that need to be fixed in order to improve food safety,
most food safety improvements will most likely be made by commercial interests.
Governmental gridlock is too strong and complicated for significant regulatory changes
and local corruption is too pervasive to improve. It is in the interest of commercial
enterprises however to become self-regulating and engage in self-inspections because
better quality food means more consumer confidence and then an increase in revenue.
Therefore, although the largest flaws are governmental regulatory structure and
implementation, the most practical method of improving food safety will need to be
pursued by commercial enterprises.
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